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Case No. 7341
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

DELORES E. GREN, Individually
and as Guardi·an Ad Litem of Gordon V. Gren, Geraldine Gren, and
Vivian Gren, Minor Children of
Melvin V. Gren, Deceased,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

-vs.PRESTON L. NORTON and ~,
NORTON,
Defendants and Appellants.
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Officer J anws Lansing·, called by defendants, testified that he saw the deceased the n1orning of the accident
at the Liberty Cafe in Provo (Tr. 145), and that there
was an odor of_whiskey on his breath (Tr. 146), and ,that
from his speech ( Tr. 147), and general manner of handling himself he knew that deceased had been drinking.
This action was commenced by plain tiff Delores E.
Gren, surviving wife, in behalf of herself and surviving
minor children, Gordon V. Gren, Geraldine Gren and
Vivian Gren. The first trial of the action commenced
on Xovember 10, 1947, and the jury returned a verdict
of no cause of action on November 15, 1947. Thereafter,
the court granted a new trial. The second trial commenced on December 8, 1948, and on December 14, 1948,
~he jury returned a verdict in favor of .plaintiffs, awarding funeral and burial expenses of $558.50, and general
damages of $8,000.00.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
Appellants rely upon the following errors:
Error No. 1
The trial court erred in denying defendants' Motion for a Directed Verdict ( Tr. 236) .
Error No.2
The trial court erred in denying defendants' Motion
for a Non-suit (Tr. 115).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Error No.3
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 5, to
which the defendan,ts excepted (Tr. 265).
Error No.4
The trial court erred in giving paragraph 2 of Instruction No. 5, to which the defendants excepted (Tr.
265).
Error No.5
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 6, to
which the defendants excepted ( Tr. 265).
Error No.6
The trial court erred in giving paragraph 3 of Instruction No. 6, to which defendants excepted (Tr. 266).
Error No.7
The trial court erred in giving instruction No. 8, to
which defendants excepted (Tr. 266).
Error No.8
The trial court erred in giving paragraph 3 of Instruction No. 8, to which defendants excepted (Tr. 266).
Error No.9
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 17,
to which the defendants excepted (Tr. 266).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Error No. 10
The trial court erred in giving the following portion of Instruction No. 17, to "·hich defendants ex·cepted
(Tr. 267).
U·

''This presumption is not conclusive, but is a
matter to be considered by the jury, in connection
· with all the other facts and circumstances in the
case, in determining whether or not the deceased
Melvin V. Gren was guilty of contributory negligence at the time of the accident.''
Error No. 11

··.

b·

The trial court erred in giving the following portion
of Instruction No. 19, to which defendants excepted {Tr.
268).
"Further, if you should find the issues in
favor of the plaintiffs, you may assess as damages, the cost of funeral and burial expense,
which said sum shall not be in excess of $558.50. ''
Error No. 12
The trial court erred in giving· the following portion
of Instruction No. 21, to which defendants excepted (Tr.
268).
"That the intersection of 5th West Street and
12th North, where the accident occurred, constitutes a single intersection even though 5th West
at that point has neutral zones separating opposing traffic lanes. ''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Error No. 13
The trial ·court erred in giving Instruction No. 23,
to which the defendants excepted (Tr. 268).
Error No. 14

]U

The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 25,
to which the defendants excepted (Tr. 268).
Error No. 15
The trial court erred in giving paragraph 3 of Instruction No. 25, to which the defendants excepted (Tr.
268).
Error No. 16.
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the
jury in accordance with defendants' requesrt for Instruction No. 5, to which refusal defendants excepted (Tr.
269).
Error No. 17
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the
jury in accordance with defendants' request for Instruction No. 7, to which refusal defendants exceprted (Tr.
269).
Error No. 18
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the
jury in accordance with defendants' request for InstrucSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion No. 13, to which refusal defendants excepted (Tr.
269).
Error No. 19
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the
jury in accordance with defendants' request for Instruction No. 14, to which refusal defendants excepted (Tr.
270).
Error

~o.

20

The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
in accordance with defendants' request for Instruction
No. 15, to which refusal defendants excepted (Tr. 270).
ARGUMENT
Error No. 1
This error is directed to the order of the trial court,
overruling defendants' motion for a directed verdict.
The grounds of the motion were as follows (Tr. 110,
234):
1. That the plaintiffs' complaint fails to
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of acticTt against the defendants, or either of them.

2. That there is a total want of evidence to
establish that the defendants, or either of them,
was guilty of any act of negligence alleged in the
complaint which proximately caused, or contributed to the collision between the defendant's truck
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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and trailer and the deceased's autom·obile, result . .
ing in the death of the deceased.
3. That there is a total want of evidence to
establish the defendants or either of them was
guilty of any act of negligence set forth in the
complaint.
4. That the evidence shows without a dispute that the deceased himself was guilty of
negligence as a matter of law, in that while entering and crossing said intersection the deceased,
carelessly and negligently failed to kee'P a propPi'
or any look out for vehicles travelling south upon
the west side of 5th West street in Provo approaching the intersection of said street with 12th
North street, on which street the deceased was
travelling in a westerly direction; and that said
negligence and failure of the deceased proximately contributed to the collision involved in
this case, resulting in the death of the deceased.
5. That the evidence shows without dispute
that the deceased was guilty of negligence, as a
matter of law, in that while entering and crossing
said intersection, he carelessly and negligently
failed to keep a 'proper or any look out for vehicles
travelling south upon the west side of 5th West
street in Provo, Utah, approaching said interseC'tion of said street with 12th North street, on
which street the deceased was travelling in a
westerly direction, in sufficient time to avoid the
collision involved in this action, and that said
negligence and failure proximately contributed,
as a matter of law, to the said collision.
6. That the evidence shows without dispute
tha:t when the deceased reached the island and
was in the act of entering that portion of the
highw'ay at 5th West street, reserved for south
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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bound traffic on the said street, the defendant
Preston ~ orton was approximately 100 feet
north of the intersection, and began sounding his
horn and applying his brakes ;
. Also that the evidence shows without dispute
that the deceased, in passing from the east side
of 5th "~est street, to the island, and thence over
the west side of 5th West street, carelessly and
negligently failed to keep a proper or any look
out for vehicles travelling south on 5th West
street, until he reached the point near the west
edge of the concrete on 5th \Y est street, and in
the \Yest lane of the two lanes on said street reserved for south bound traffic; and that by reason
of said failure the deceased was negligent, ·as a
matter of law, and that said negligence proximately contributed to the collision and resulting
death of the deceased.

7. That the evidence in this case shows without dispute that 5th West street in Provo, Utah,
was a through highway, and that the deceased,
as a matter of law, was required, in addition to
bringing his automobile to a stop at the entrance
thereof, prior to entering on said highway, to
yield the right of way to other vehicles which
were approaching so close on said through highway ·as to constitute an immediate hazard;
That the evidence also shows without dispute
that the deceased entered and ~proceeded through
said through highway at a time when the defendants' truck was approaching the intersection between 5th West street and 12th North street,
Provo, Utah, and was so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard; and that the evidence also shows without dispute that the deceased failed to yield the right of way to defendSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ants' truck, and that by reason of said failure,
the deceased was negligent, as a matter of law,
and that said negligence proximately contributed
to the collision involved in this case and resulting
death of the deceased.
8. That the evidence shows, without dispute,
that at no time, after leaving the stop sign and
while traversing the said intersection, did the
deceased exercise the degree ·of care required of
one in driving an automobile through an intersection, in this : That the deceased carelessly anJ
negligently failed to keep a proper lookout, or
any lookout at all while traversing the intersection ; and that by reason of such failure the deceased, as a matter of law, \Yas negligent and
that said negligence proximately contributed to
the collision and the deceased's resulting death.
9. That the evidence shows without dispute,
that at no time, after leaving the stop sign and
while traversing the said intersection, did the
deceased exercise that degree of care required of
one driving an automobile through an intersection in this : That the deceased upon reaching a
point at or near the south side of the first island
in said U. S. Highway 91 located north of the intersection, at a time when the defendants' truck
travelling south was approaching so close to deceased's lane of travel, as to constitute an immediate hazard; and carelessly and negligently
failed to stop his automobile at or near said place
and allow the defendant's truck to enter the intersection, and proceed through there; and that
by reason of such failure, the deceased, as a
matter of law, was negligent and that such negligence proximately contributed to the collision and
the deceased's resulting death.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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9
Officer James Lansing, called by defendants, testified that he ~aw the deceased the n1orning of the accident
at the Liberty Cafe in Provo (Tr. 145), and that there
was an odor of whiskey on his breath (Tr. 146}, and ,that
from his speech (Tr. 147), and general manner of handling himself he knew that deceased had been drinking.
This action was commenced by plain tiff Delores E.
Gren, surviving wife, in behalf of herself and surviving
minor children, Gordon V. Gren, Geraldine Gren and
Vivian Gren. The first trial of the action commenced
on November 10, 1947, and the jury returned a verdict
of no cause of action on November 15, 1947. Thereafter,
the court granted a new trial. The second trial commenced on December 8, 1948, and on December 14, 1948,
~he jury returned a verdict in favor of .plaintiffs, awarding funeral and burial expenses of $558.50, and general
damages of $8,000.00.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
Appellants rely upon the following errors:
Error No. 1
The trial court erred in denying defendants' Motion for a Directed Verdict (Tr. 236).
Error No. 2
The trial court erred in denying defendants' Motion
for a Non-suit (Tr. 115).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Error No.3
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 5, to
which the defendan,ts excepted (Tr. 265).

~on
iJ1

Error No.4
The trial court erred in giving paragraph 2 of Instruction No. 5, to which the defendants excepted (Tr.
265).
Error No.5
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 6, to
which the defendants excepted (Tr. 265).
Error No.6
The trial court erred in giving paragraph 3 of Instruction No. 6, to which defendants excepted (Tr. 266).
Error No.7
The trial court erred in giving instruction No. 8, to
which defendants exce:pted (Tr. 266).
Error No.8
The trial court erred in giving paragraph 3 of Instruction No. 8, to which defendants excepted (Tr. 266).
Error No.9
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 17,
to which the defendants excepted (Tr. 266).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Error No. 10
The trial court erred in giving the following portion of Instruction No. 17, to which defendants ex·cepted
(Tr. 267).
''This presumption is not conclusive, but is a
matter to be considered by the jury, in connection
with all the other facts and circumstances in ·the
case, in determining whether or not the deceased
Melvin V. Gren was guilty of contributory negligence at the time of the accident.''
Error No. 11
The trial court erred in giving the following portion
of Instruction No. 19, to which defendants excepted (Tr.
268).
"Further, if you should find the issues in
favor of the plaintiffs, you may assess as damages, the cost of funeral and burial expense,
which said sum shall not be in excess of $558.50. ''
Error No. 12
The trial court erred in giving the following portion
of Instruction No. 21, to which defendants excepted (Tr.
268).
"That the intersection of 5th West Street and
12th North, where the accident occurred, constitutes a single intersection even though 5th West
at that point has neutral zones separating opposing traffic lanes.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Error No. 13
The trial eourt erred in giving Instruction No. 23,
to which the defendants excepted (Tr. 268).
Error No. 14
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 25,
to which the defendants excepted (Tr. 268).
Error No. 15
The trial court erred in giving paragraph 3 of Instruction No. 25, to which the defendants excepted (Tr.
268).

illi

Error No. 16
The trial eourt erred in refusing to instruct the
jury in accordance with defendants' request for Instruction No. 5, to which refusal defendants excepted (Tr.
269).
Error No. 17
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the
jury in accordance with defendants' request for Instruction No. 7, to which refusal defendants exce'pited (Tr.
269).
Error No. 18
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the
jury in accordance with defendants' request for Ins trueSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion .No. 13, to whieh refusal defendants excepted ( Tr.
269).
Error No. 19
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the
jury in accordance with defendants' request for Instruction ~o. 14, to which refusal defendants excepted (Tr.
270).
Error Xo. 20
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
in accordance with defendants' request for ins1truction
No. 15, to which refusal defendants excepted (Tr. 270).
ARGUMENT
Error No.1
This error is directed to the order of the trial court,
overruling defendants' motion for a directed verdict.
The grounds of the motion were as follows (Tr. 110,
234):
I:

1. That the plaintiffs' complaint fails to
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants, or either of them.

2. That there is a total want of evidence to
establish that the defendants, or either of them,
was guilty of any act of negligence alleged in the
complaint which proximately caused, or contributed to the collision between the defendant's truck
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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and trailer and the deceased's automobile,
ing in the death of the deceased.

result~

3. That there is a total want of evidence to
establish the defendants or either of them was
guilty of any act of negligence set forth in the
complaint.
4. That the evidence shows without a dispute that the deceased himself was guilty of
negligence as a matter of law, in that while entering and crossing said intersection the deceased,
carelessly and negligently failed to kee'P a proper
or any look out for vehicles travelling south u:pon
the west side of 5th West street in Provo approaching the intersection of said street with 12th
North street, on which street the deceased was
travelling in a westerly direction; and that said
negligence and failure of the deceased proximately contributed . to the collision involved in
this case, resulting in the death of the deceased.
5. That the evidence shows without dispute
that the deceased was guilty of negligence, as a
matter of law, in that while entering and crossing
said intersection, he carelessly and negligently
failed to keep a 'proper or any look out for vehicles
travelling south upon the west side of 5th West
street in Provo, Utah, approaching said intersection of said street with 12th North street, on
which street the deceased was travelling in a
westerly direction, in sufficient time to avoid the
collision involved in this action, and that said
negligence and failure proximately contributed,
as a matter of law, to the said collision.
6. That the evidence shows without dispute
that when the deceased reached the island and
was in the act of entering that portion of the
highway at 5th West street, reserved for south
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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bound traffic on the said street, the defendant
Preston Norton was approximately 100 feet
north of the intersection, and began sounding his
horn and applying his brakes;
Also that the evidence shows without dispute
that the deceased, in passing from the east side
of 5th West street, to the island, and thence over
the west side of 5th West street, carelessly and
negligently failed to keep a proper or any look
out for vehicles travelling south on 5th West
street, until he reached the point near the west
edge of the concrete on 5th West street, and in
the west lane of the two lanes on said street reserved for south bound traffic; and that by reason
of said failure the deceased was negligent, as a
matter of law, and that said negligence proximately contributed to the collision and resulting
death of the deceased.

~-

7. That the evidence in this case shows without dispute that 5th West street in Provo, Utah,
was a through highway, and that the deceased,
as a matter of law, was required, in addition to
bringing his automobile to a stop at the entrance
thereof, prior to entering on said highway, to
yield the right of way to other vehicles which
were approaching so close on said through highway ·as to constitute an immediate hazard;
That the evidence ·also shows without dispute
that the deceased entered and ~proceeded through
said through highway at a time when the defendants' truck was approaching the intersection between 5th West street and 12th North street,
Provo, Utah, and was so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard; and that the evidence also shows without dispute that the deceased failed to yield the right of way to defendSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
ants' truck, and that by reason of said failure,
the deceased was negligent, as a matter of law,
and that said negligence proximately contributed
to the collision involved in this case and resulting
death of the deceased.
8. That the evidence shows, without dispute,
that at no time, after leaving the stop sign anfl
while traversing the said intersection, did the
deceased exercise the degree of care required of
one in driving an automobile through an intersection, in this: That the deceased carelessly aml
negligently failed to keep a proper lookout, or
any lookout at all while traversing the intersection; and that by reason of such failure the deceased, as a matter of law, was negligent and
that said negligence proximately contributed to
the collision and the deceased's resulting death.
9. That the evidence shows without dispute,
that at no time, after leaving the stop sign and
while traversing the said intersection, did the
deceased exercise that degree of care required of
one driving an automobile through an intersection in this : That the deceased upon reaching a
point at or near the south side of the first island
in said U. S. Highway 91 located north of the intersection, at a time when the defendants' truck
travelling south was approaching so close to deceased's lane of travel, as to constitute an immediate hazard; and carelessly and negligently
failed to stop his automobile at or near said place
and allow the defendant's truck to enter the intersection, and proceed through there; and that
by reason of such failure, the deceased, as a
matter of law, was negligent and that such negligence proximately contributed to the collision and
the deceased's resulting death.
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Exhibit 1, which is an enlargement of a portion of
Exhibit A, is a diagram of the intersection area of Fifth
West and Twelfth North in Provo, Utah, which intersection was the scene of the truck collision here involved.
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larly Tr. 7 to 23), shows that Fifth West is an arterial
highway running in a general north-south direction
with two double lanes of traffic separated by a center
safety or neutral zone. The ·overall width of the highway at the intersection area is 66.5 feet, with two northbound traffic lanes of 11 feet each occupying the extreme
easterly portion, two southbound traffic lanes of 11 feet
each occupying the extreme westerly portion, and a neutral zone of 22.5 feet in the center of the highway, extending northerly from the north side of the intersection
for about 100 feet. Some distance to the north is a
second safety zone in the highway center, of roughly
the same size. These zones are curbed, have rounded
ends, and are raised from the level of the adjacent highway about six inches. A similar zone lies immediately
south of the intersection.
Twelfth North is a two-lane highway which intersects Fifth West from the east at about a 90 degree
angle. Slightly to the north of the intersection point of
Twelfth North, an old highway intersects Fifth West
on the west side, and extends in a northwesterly direction. At the northeast corner of the intersection is a
stop sign controlling traffic westbound on Twelfth
North, which is 44 feet east of the east concrete edge
of Fifth West. A service station is also located on this
corner, and the area between the service station and
Twelfth North and Fifth West is flat, hard and unobstructed.
To the north of the intersection, Fifth West extends
in a very gradual northwesterly curve in a level manner
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for about 2265 feet ( Tr. 13), and then rises in a gradual
clilnb to a point about a milE' to the north, where it again
{'untinues northward on the level. From the stop sign at
the northeast corner the highway is in :plain sight to
the top of the hill a mile to the north, and the same
visibility obtains at the south edge of the center safety
zone (Tr. 184). From the westerly traffic lanes of the
intersection there is clear visibility along Fifth West
at least to the Provo River bridge, which is 775 feet to
the north. Gasoline stations are also located on the
southeast and southwest corners of the intersection. The
posted speed limit of Fifth West from the intersection
north to the bridge is 40 miles per hour, and from that
point north, 50 miles per hour. (Tr. 90.)
On July 28, 1946, at about 4:30 P. M., defendant
Preston ~ orton was driving a semi-trailer truck heavily
loaded with lumber (Tr. 177), and weighing 26 tons (Tr.
160), in a southerly direction on the westerly traffic
lane of Fifth West, and was approaching the intersection
of that street with Twelfth North. At the same time
Melvin Gren, the deceased, was approaching the intersection from the east on Twelfth North in a 1935 Chevrolet sedan. He was alone in the automobile. Norton
testified that he first saw the Gren automobile as it was
approaching the east concrete edge of the intersection,
and at a time when the truck was an estimated 250 feet
north of the intersection (Tr. 182). He immediately
checked his brakes and sounded his horn, which was a
truck horn of greater intensity and pitch than that of
an average automobile (Tr. 186, 200). The highway beSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tween the truck and Gren automobile was clear of traffic (Tr. 187), and remained that way to the time of
collision. The Gren automobile continued in a straight
westerly direction across the intersection at about 5 or
10 miles per hour, and at a constant rate of speed, neither
slowing nor speeding up (Tr. 188). Norton observed
deceased as his car proceeded westerly, and deceased
was slumped down behind the wheel of the automobile,
looking straight ahead to the west (Tr. 188), at least
from the point where the Norton truck was 100 feet
from the intersection (Tr. 204), to a point about 10 feet
prior to the collision, when for the first time deceased
look:ed up and tried to turn his car to the left and south
(Tr. 189). When the truck was about 100 feet north of
the intersection, Norton realized that deceased was not
going to stop in the area south of the safety or neutral
zone (Tr. 187, 190, 215), and locked his brakes and put
his horn on full blast. At the same time he started
edging his truck to the westerly side of the highway, and
the right wheels of the truck were actually off on the
west gravel shoulder at the time of the impact (Tr. 203).
The service station on the southwest corner of the intersection and a telephone pole on the northwest corner
prevented his driving the truck any farther west than
he did in an attempt to avoid the collision. Norton also
testified that he had had a broad experience in driving
a similar type of Chevrolet to that driven by deceased,
and that at the speed the automobile was going prior to
the accident it could have been stopped in not to exceed
four feet (Tr. 192). He also testified that the Chevrolet
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Y:n:s 15 to 18 feet long, and that there was an1ple room

for it ·within the area of 22.5 feet south of the safety
zone (Tr. 193). He stated that the truck, loaded as it
was, could have been stopped in 175 to 200 feet at a
speed of 35 miles per hour. Norton stated that at the
tin1e his truck reached the level area to the north of
the intersection, he was traveling about 40 miles per
hour (Tr. 184), and that at a point just prior to impact
he had slowed to 30 or 35 miles per hour (Tr. 210).
Paul Adamson, a ·witness called by Plaintiff, was
standing on the north side and in front of his car which
was being serviced at the service station on the southeast corner of the intersection, when he first observed
the Gren automobile going west on 12th North about
100 feet east of the stop sign on the northeast corner of
the intersection. At this point the Gren automobile was
slowly traveling in low gear with the motor occasionally
racing (Tr. 26). The Gren automobile storpped at the
stop sign (Tr. 26), with deceased slumped behind the
wheel, low in the seat, and facing directly west (Tr. 31).
Adamson did not again notice the Gren car until it
reached the south side of the traffic or neutral zone in
the middle of Fifth West and was entering the west
traffic lanes, at which point his attention was called to
the car by the words of his son who called, "Look out,
fellow, you're going to get hit," or words to that effect.
At this point the southbound truck was honking furiously and the Gren car was traveling at a very slow
rate of speed with its driver still slumped over the
wheel, facing directly to the west. As the Gren car got
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to the westerly side of the intersection, the deceased
looked up for the first time, and then swerved his car a
little to his left when the impact occurred (Tr. 36). As
the truck approached the point of collision it edged to
the west, and the right wheels of the truck were off the
concrete portion of the highway when the impact occurred. ( Tr. 38, 39.)
Kenneth Adamson, a witness called by defendants,
was also at the southeast corner of the intersection, and
first noticed the Gren automobile proceeding westerly
from the stop sign at the northeast corner of the intersection (Tr. 117). He observed the Gren car as it
traversed the intersection at a very slow, constant rate
of speed, with the driver slumped low in the seat looking
straight to the west as this car went through the intersection. He stated that the impact occurred at the west
edge of the intersection, and that when the deceased was
about 15 feet away from the collision he looked up for
the first and only time and tried to turn to his left, but
did not succeed in making any appreciable change in
course prior to impact ( Tr. 120, 121). He also stated
that he heard the truck horn the first time when the
truck was 250 to 300 feet north of the intersection (Tr.
123), and that he heard the horn again prior to the
accident (Tr. 124). The sounding of the horn had no
effect on the deceased as he drove his automobile westerly through the intersection (Tr. 125, 129).
Officer Louis J. Brandon, witness called by plaintiff, arrived at the scene shortly after the accident, and
placed the impact, based upon the physical evidence, at
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a point :2 feet 9 inches east of the west concrete edge of
the highway, and a trifle north of the center line of 12th
~ orth. He used the center line of the truck as imp8!.C t.
point (Tr. 68). Truck tire Inarks extended from the
im·pact area northerly for a distance of 55 feet 10 inches,
and at the north end were 10 to 12 feet east of ~the west
concrete edge (Tr. 73). There were two sets of tire
marks at the north end, but the westerly line of the
marks veered off the concrete a,t a point 40 feet south
of the commencement point at the north (Tr. 73). After
impact, the truck traveled 179 feet 2 inches (Tr. 67)
along the west shoulder of the highway, where it came
to resrt in front of a store. Deceased was apparently
killed instantly. Driver Norton testified, however, that
the impact severed the air lines to the brakes, and that
he had no braking power thereafter.
\Vitness Jack C. Bullock, called by plaintiff, rtestified that he was driving southward on Fifth West at a
point % mile north of the intersection when the truck
passed his automobile (Tr. 43). At that poill(t Bullock
was traveling about 40 miles per hour, and he estimated
the speed of the truck as it passed him to have been
about 50 miles per hour (Tr. 44). He also testified, however, that between ,the point at which the truck passed
him and the point of collision, the truck advanced in
front of his automobile only a block or a block and a
half (Tr. 47). Defendant M. Norton, however, testified
that the truck speed was regulated by a governor, which
in connection

w~th

the diesel motor speed and gears,
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made it a physical impossibility to drive the truck faster
than 47lj:2 m.p.h. (Tr. 158, 159).
Witness Wesley Carter, called by plaintiff, who was
approaching the intersection from the south, stated tha,t
he estimated the truck \Yas going possibly 50 or 55 miles
per hour 150 to 180 feet north of the intersection (Tr.
51). He also tes,tified that he noticed the Gren car
progressing slowly and steadily through the intersection,
without stopping or changing its estimated speed of 10
to 15 miles ·per hour (Tr. 51, 55).
Witness Tom Bingham, called by defendants, first
saw deceased the day of the accident in ,the early morning, when deceased came to the door of the Bingham
home. Deceased had been drinking and was ''oiled up
a little" (Tr. 225). He was also carrying one-half of !1
fifth of whiskey, which he and Bingham drank between
the time of arrival and an hour later when they went to
the Provo River (Tr. 224). They remained at the Provo
River, swimming and drinking (Tr. 226), un,til about
three o'clock in the afternoon, and during this time consumed an additional fifth of whiskey, more or less between them (Tr. 226). They left the Provo River and
returned to the Bingham home, and by this time Bingham himself was so intoxicated tha,t he could not be sure
of the exact condition of the deceased in this regard ( Tr.
226). Deceased thereafter left the Bingham home in his
automobile.

Within about one-half hour thereafter,

Bingham called the Gren home, and was advised thfut the
accident had occurred (Tr. 227).
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Exhibit 1, which is an enlargement of a portion of
Exhibit A, is a diagram of the intersection area of Fifth
West and Twelfth North in Provo, Utah, which intersection '"as the scene of the truck collision here involved.
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larly Tr. 7 to 23), shows that Fifth West is an arterial
highway running in a general north-south direction
with two double lanes of traffic separated by a center
safety or neutral zone. The overall width of the highway at the intersection area is 66.5 feet, with two northbound traffic lanes of 11 feet each occupying the extreme
easterly portion, two southbound traffic lanes of 11 feet
each occupying the extreme westerly portion, and a neutral zone of 22.5 feet in the center of the highway, extending northerly from the north side of the intersection
for about 100 feet. Some distance to the north is a
second safety zone in the highway center, of roughly
the same size. These zones are curbed, have rounded
ends, and are raised from the level of the adjacent highway about six inches. A similar zone lies immediately
south of the intersection.
Twelfth North is a two-lane highway which intersects Fifth West from the east at about a 90 degree
angle. Slightly to the north of the intersection point of
Twelfth North, an old highway intersects Fifth West
on the west side, and extends in a northwesterly direction. At the northeast corner of the intersection is a
stop sign controlling traffic westbound on Twelfth
North, which is 44 feet east of the east concrete edge
of Fifth West. A service station is also located on this
corner, and the area between the service station and
Twelfth North and Fifth West is flat, hard and unobstructed.
To the north of the intersection, Fifth West extends
in a very gradual northwesterly curve in a level manner
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for about 2265 feet (Tr. 13), and then rises in a gradual
climb to a point about a mile to the north, where it again
continues northward on the level. From the stop sign at
the northeast corner the highway is in :plain sight to
the top of the hill a Inile to the north, and the same
visibility obtains at the south edge of the center safety
zone (Tr. 184). From the westerly traffic lanes of the
intersection there is clear visibility along Fifth West
at least to the Provo River bridge, which is 775 feet to
the north. Gasoline stations are also located on the
southeast and southwest corners of the intersection. The
posted speed limit of Fifth West from the intersection
north to the bridge is 40 miles per hour, and from that
point north, 50 miles per hour. (Tr. 90.)
On July 28, 1946, at about 4:30 P. M., defendant
Preston Norton was driving a semi-trailer truck heavily
loaded with lumber (Tr. 177), and weighing 26 tons (Tr.
160), in a southerly direction on the westerly traffic
lane of Fifth West, and was approaching the intersection
of that street with Twelfth North. At the same time
Melvin Gren, the deceased, was approaching the intersection from the east on Twelfth North in a 1935 Chevrolet sedan. He was alone in the automobile. Norton
testified that he first saw the Gren automobile as it was
approaching the east concrete edge of the intersection,
and at a time when the truck was an estimated 250 feet
north of the intersection (Tr. 182). He immediately
checked his brakes and sounded his horn, which was a
truck horn of greater intef!.sity and pitch than that of
an average automobile (Tr. 186, 200). The highway beSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tween the truck and Gren autonwbile was clear of traffic (Tr. 187), and remained that way to the time of
collision. The Gren automobile continued in a straight
westerly direction across the intersection at about 5 or
10 miles per hour, and at a constant rate of speed, neither
slowing nor speeding up (Tr. 188). Norton observed
deceased as his car proceeded westerly, and deceased
'"~as slumped down behind the wheel of the automobile,
looking straight ahead to the west (Tr. 188), at least
from the point where the Norton truck was 100 feet
from the intersection (Tr. 204), to a point about 10 feet
prior to the collision, when for the first time deceased
looked up and tried to turn his car to the left and south
(Tr. 189). When the truck was about 100 feet north of
the intersection, Norton realized that deceased was riot
going to stop in the area south of the safety or neutral
zone (Tr. 187, 190, 215), and locked his brakes and put
his horn on full blast. At the same time he started
edging his truck to the westerly side of the highway, and
the right wheels of the truck were actually off on the
west gravel shoulder at the time of the impact (Tr. 203).
The service station on the southwest corner of the intersection and a telephone pole on the northwest corner
prevented his driving the truck any farther west than
he did in an attempt to avoid the collision. Norton also
testified that he had had a broad experience in driving
a similar type of' Chevrolet to that driven by deceased,
and that at the speed the automobile was going prior to
the accident it could have been stopped in not to exceed
four feet (Tr. 192). He also testified that the Chevrolet
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wa8 15 to 18 feet long, and that there was mnple room
for it ·within the area of ~:2.5 feet south of the safety
zont> ( Tr. 193). He 8ta ted that the truck, loaded as it
was, could have been stopped in 175 to 200 feet at a
speed of 35 mile8 per hour. Norton stated that at the
tin1e hi~ truck reached the level area to the north of
the intersection, he ·was traveling about 40 miles per
hour (Tr. 184), and that at a point just prior to impact
he had slowed to 30 or 35 miles per hour ( Tr. 210).
Paul Ada1nson, a "·itness called by Plaintiff, was
standing on the north side and in front of his car which
\Yas being serviced at the service station on the southeast corner of the intersection, when he first observed
the Gren automobile going west on 12th North about
100 feet east of the stop sign on the northeast corner of
the intersection. At this point the Gren automobile was
slmdy traveling in low gear with the motor occasionally
racing (Tr. 26). The Gren automobile stopped at the
stop sign (Tr. 26), with deceased slumped behind the
wheel, low in the seat, and facing directly west (Tr. 31).
Adamson did not again notice the Gren car until it
reached the south side of the traffic or neutral zone in
the middle of Fifth West and was entering the west
traffic lanes, at which point his attention was called to
the car by the words of his son who called, "Look out,
fellow, you're going to get hit," or words to that effect.
At this point the southbound truck was honking furiously and the Gren car was traveling at a very slow
rate of speed with its driver still slumped over the
wheel, facing directly to the west. As the Gren car got
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to the westerly side of the intersection, the deceased
looked up for the first time, and then swerved his car a
little to his left when the impact occurred (Tr. 36). As
the truck approached the point of collision it edged to
the west, and the right wheels of the truck were off the
concrete portion of the highway when the impact occurred. ( Tr. 38, 39.)
Kenneth Adamson, a witness called by defendants,
was also at the southeast corner of the intersection, and
first noticed the Gren automobile proceeding westerly
from the stop sign at the northeast corner of the intersection (Tr. 117). He observed the Gren car as it
traversed the intersection at a very slow, constant rate
of speed, with the driver slump1ed low in the seat lookinl}
straight to the west as this car went through the intersection. He stated that the impact occurred at the west
edge of the intersection, and that when the deceased was
about 15 feet away from the collision he looked up for
the first and only time and tried to turn to his left, but
did not succeed in making any appreciable change in
course prior to impact (Tr. 120, 121). He also stated
that he heard the truck horn the first time when the
truck was 250 to 300 feet north of the intersection (Tr.
123), and that he heard the horn again prior to the
accident (Tr. 124). The sounding of the horn had no
effect on the deceased as he drove his automobile westerly through the intersection (Tr. 125, 129).
Officer Louis J. Brandon, witness called by plaintiff, arrived at the scene shortly after the accident, and
placed the impact, based upon the physical evidence, at
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a point :2 feet 9 inches east of the west concrete edge of
the higlnYay. and a trifle north of the center line of 12th
Xorth. He used the center line of the truck as imp8!.C t
point (Tr. 68). Truck tire 1narks extended from the
im·pact area northerly for a distance of 55 feet 10 inches,
and at the north end were 10 to 12 feet east of ~the west
concrete edge (Tr. 73). There were two sets of tire
marks at the north end, but the westerly line of the
Inarks veered off the concrete rut a point 40 feet south
of the con1mencement point at the north (Tr. 73). After
impact, the truck traveled 179 feet 2 inches (Tr. 67)
along the west shoulder of the highway, where it came
to resrt in front of a store. Deceased was apparently
killed instantly. Driver Norton testified, however, that
the impact severed the air lines to the brakes, and that
he had no braking power thereafter.
Witness Jack C. Bullock, called by plaintiff, ,testified that he was driving southward on Fifth West at a
point lf2 mile north of the intersection when the truck
passed his automobile (Tr. 43). At that poillf1 Bullock
was traveling about 40 miles per hour, and he estimated
the speed of the truck as it passed him to have been
about 50 miles per hour (Tr. 44). He also testified, however, that between rthe point at which the truck passed
him and the point of collision, the ·truck advanced in
front of his automobile only a block or a block and a
half (Tr. 47). Defendant M. Norton, however, testified
that the truck speed was regulated by a governor, which
in connection

w~th

the diesel motor speed and gears,
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made it a physical impossibility to drive the truck faster
than 47Jj2 m.p.h. (Tr. 158, 159).
Witness Wesley Carter, called by plaintiff, who was
approaching the intersection from the south, stated tha,t
he estimated the truck was going possibly 50 or 55 miles
per hour 150 to 180 feet north of the intersection (Tr.
51). l-Ie also tes,tified that he noticed the Gren car
progressing slovdy and steadily through the intersection,
without stopping or changing its estimated speed of 10
to 15 miles per hour (Tr. 51, 55).
Witness Tom Bingham, called by defendants, first
saw deceased the day of the accident in ~he early morning, when deceased came to the door of the Bingham
home. Deceased had been drinking and was ''oiled up
a little" (Tr. 225). He was also carrying one-half of !1
fifth of whiskey, which he and Bingham drank between
the time of arrival and an hour later when they went to
the Provo River (Tr. 224). They remained at the Provo
River, swimming and drinking (Tr. 226), un,til about
three o'clock in the afternoon, and during this time consumed an additional fifth of whiskey, more or less between them (Tr. 226). They left the Provo River and
returned to the Bingham home, and by this time Binghan1 himself was so ·intoxicated tha,t he could not be sure
of the exact condition of the deceased in this regard (Tr.
226). Deceased thereafter left the Bingham home in his
automobile.

Within about one-half hour thereafter,

Bingham called the Gren home, and was advised thfut the
accident had occurred (Tr. 227).
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feet or le~~- How can decea~Pd, by any stn•tch of the
imagination, be deen1ed free of negligence, when, at the
time he passed the zone, and even as he proceeded westerly from its protected area, the truck was in plain sight
as it had been during his entire traverse of the intersection, with the horn sounding full blast and the truck
driver attempting to avoid the collision by pulling to
the west?
Another recent Utah case concerned with the same
principles of tort law, although involving a pedestrian
and automobile, is that of Mingus vs. Olsson, 201 P. 2nd
495 (Utah, 1949). In that case the deceased pedestrian

sustained fatal injuries when struck by an automobile
as he attempted to cross Thirteenth East Street in Salt
Lake City, Utah. The automobile was proceeding southward on said street at about 8:15. p.m. when the deceased
stepped from the west curb and started across on an
unmarked cross-walk. The language of the court emphasized the similarity between this case and the one before
the court, page 498 :
''Mrs. Venice Mingus, decedent's wife who
was with him at the time of the accident, testified
that as they stepped off the curb and started
easterly .across Thirteenth East Street, decedent
was to her left or north; that he looked neither
to his left nor right, but looked straight ahead as
they proceeded across the street; that he said
nothing to her about approaching traffic; that she
did not see or hear defendant's automobile until
it struck; and that they had proceeded about a
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quarter of the way (about 10 feet) across the
street when they were struck.''
In affirming the directed verdict of the lower court
the decision states, page 498:
''More convincing than the direct testimony
that deceased did not look, is the further evidence that deceased neither said nor did anything to indicate that he was at all aware of the
danger presented by defendant's approaching
automobile. He seems to have been wholly wnaware of its approach. Certainly he did nothing
either to warn his wife, nor to rescue either himself or her from their position of peril. On this
evidence, it must be said as a matter of law that
deceased either failed to look, or having looked,
failed to see what he should have seen.
''There can be no doubt that a ;pedestrian who
undertakes to cross a busy street of a large city,
without first observing for vehicular traffic is
guilty of contributory negligence. And this is
true, even though he may be crossing in a crosswalk, and have the right of way. In the recent
case of Hickok vs. Skinner, Utah, 190 P. 2d 514,
this court held that a motorist who had the right
of way across an intersection, nevertheless had a
duty to observe for traffic as he proceeded across
the intersection. The rights of pedestrians to the
use of the public streets are the same as those of
motorists-neither greater nor less. Hence, the
same general duties devolve upon them. A pedestrian crossing a public street in a crosswalk or
pedestrian lane, although he may have the right
of way QVer vehicular traffic, nonetheless has the
duty to observe for such traffic. Clearly, decedent neglected that duty in this case. It follows
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that he was contributorily negligent as a matter

of law. Of course we do not mean to imply that

a mere glance in the direction of the approaching
automobile would suffice. The duty to look has
i-nherent in it the duty to see what is there to be
seen. and to pay heed to it."
In BuUock vs. Luke, 98 P. 2d 350 (Ut.), an accident
occurred at an intersection at which there were neither
stop signs nor traffic lights, between a northbound
motorcycle and an eastbound truck. The facts can be
distinguished from those of the instant case, but the
principles of law set forth in the decision are clearly
applicable. That case clearly holds that it is incumbent
upon a driver to see that which is in plain sight, and to
govern his actions aocordingly. Judgment for plaintiff
was reversed with directions to enter judgment for defendant. The decision states, page 352:

'' ... It is sufficient if under all the circumstances we can properly say that Bullock's failure to see Luke was, as a matter of law, negligence. When we consider that the view west on
First South was unobstructed for a distance of
200 to 800 feet, varying with a position from 20
to 60 feet south of the south intersection line of
Third West, and that through all that distance,
and even farther, Bullock failed to see Luke, we
believe reasonable minds cannot differ as to
negligence on the part of Bullock.''
That the Utah rule is supported by the decisions of
other States is apparent from an examination of those
decisions. Thus, in Nelson vs. Linderman, 284 N. W. 693
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(Mich.), southbound plaintiff collided with east bound
defendant at a right angle intersection. Plaintiff testified that at 8 or 10 feet north of the intersection he saw
defendant's car about 300 feet west of the intersection,
and speeded up to 15 or 16 miles per hour, and had just
crossed the center line when his car was struck. In
affirming a judgment of a directed verdict for defendant,
the court stated, page 694:
"In the case at bar, plaintiff had to travel a
distance of a~pproximately 35 feet in order to get
to a place of safety. He could stop his car within
a distance of four or five feet. Under the circumstances in this case, plaintiff driver's failure to
make any observations while he was traveling the
last 25 feet precludes recovery. Something more
than a fleeting glance at an approaching car is
necessary if plaintiff seeks to avoid the burden of
contributory negligence.''
In Affelgren vs. Kinka, 40 A. 2d 418 (Pa.), plaintiff
was driving southwesterly on Willow Grove and de;...
fendant was driving southeasterly on Stenton Avenue,
which intersected the former at right angles. There was
a traffic light on a raised standard in the center of
Stenton and on the northwest intersection line, which
was to plaintiff's right as he proceeded through the intersection. As plaintiff reached the intersection line, he
saw defendant's car about 300 feet away approaching at
a speed of 25 miles an hour. Plaintiff proceeded at 3 or
4 miles an hour across the intersection, and when he
reached the center of the intersection, saw defendant's
car 60 feet away. He proceeded across, increasing his
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speed slightly, and the front of his car had passed the
far intersection line when defendant's car hit his car
on the right rear. In sustaining the non-suit granted
by the lower court, the appellate court stated:
''The law does not permit the driving· of automobiles into and through intersections when the
possible margin of safety is so close. On the contrary, it has wisely proclaimed it to be the duty
of the driver of a vehicle crossing a two-way street
to look to his right as he nears the Iniddle of the
street before entering into the traffic lane coming
from that direction ... citations ... and to yield
the right of way to a vehicle approaching from
the right unless so far in advance of it that in the
exercise of care and prudence he is reasonably
justified in believing that he can cross ahead of
it without danger of collision . . . citations . . .
Here, plaintiff had no warrant whatever for such
a belief. Defendant admits that he himself was
negligent, but plaintiff was so clearly guilty of
contributory negligence that the court could not
properly have submitted his case to the jury.''
In Davis vs. Baker, 28 A. 2d 740 (Maine), the court
stated, page 741 :
"The driver of an automobile intending to cross
a street or highway in front of another car approaching from the opposite direction is charged
with the duty of so watching and timing the movements of the other car as to reasonably insure
himself of a safe passage either in front or to the
rear of such car and even to the point of stopping
and waiting if necessary. A failure to comply
with this rule spells negligence ... citations ...
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30
It is equally well settled that in order to charge the
driver coming from the opposite direction with
negligence in pursuing his course in such a situation, it is the duty of the operator of the car making the crossing to make known his intention to
cross. Unless and until the car coming on its own
right of way has such notice, its driver cannot be
charged with negligence because of his failure to
cease his advance . . . The application of these
rules is not avoided by the failure of the driver
making the crossing to see the car approaching
from the opposite direction if its presence and
approach are obvious. An automobile driveT ·is
bound to use his eyes to see seasonably that which
is op1en and apparent and gov·ern himself suitably. He is charged with seeing that which in
the exercise of reasonable care ought to have been
seen .... ''

In Porreca vs. North Cleaners,& Dyers, 23 A. 2d 72
(Pa.), defendant's truck, which was westbound on an
arterial highway, collided with plaintiff's car which was
northbound on a street intersecting at right angles.
Plaintiff had stopped at the stop sign before crossing.
Plaintiff was traveling about 3 to 5 miles per hour upon
entering the intersection and saw defendant's truck
approaching about 140 feet to the east and 'plaintiff's
right, at a speed of about 35 to 45 miles per hour.
Plaintiff could have stopped his car at this speed in two
or three feet. When he reached the southerly end of a
double set of street car tracks extending east and west,
the defendant's truck had covered about one-third to
one-half of the distance toward the intersection from
the point where first seen. Plaintiff crossed the double
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tracks and was struck by the truck. Judgment sustaining defendant's motion for judgment n. o. Y. affirmed.
At page 73, the decision states:
· · ": e Inay assume that the driYer of defendant's truck was negligent, but plaintiff was also
neg·ligent when he took a chance and did not look
again before entering the westbound traffic lane
of Snyder Avenue .... He had no right to enter
therein unless, in the exercise of reasonable care
and prudence, he was justified in believing that
he could get across ahead of defendant's truck ...
Without having observed the location of the approaching truck he had no basis for such a belief.''
And at page 74:
''Plaintiff, according to his own testimony,
could have stop:ped when he reached the eastbound trolley tracks and saw defendant's truck
rapidly approaching in the westbound traffic lane
then 90 to 120 feet distant. It was only when his
automobile had gone from the north rail of the
westbound trolley track into the westbound traffic
lane that he looked again to his right and saw
that an accident was unavoidable (25a). Had he
continued to look for the truck approaching from
his right, he could have stopped, as he stated,
within a foot or two, and the accident would have
been averted. The principle has been many times
repeated that a driver who enters a street intersection without looking for vehicles proceeding on
the cross street, or who looks but proceeds directly
into the path of a rapidly ap:proaching vehicle, is
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. At
an intersection, a driver must not only look for
cross traffic but must continue to look as he
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crosses in order to avoid a possible collision:
J aski et ux v. West Park Daily Cleaners & Dyers
Inc., 334 Pa. 12, at page 14, 5 A. 2d 105, at page
106. Plaintiff having twice observed the truck approaching on his right did not discharge his duty
by attempting to cross in its path without again
taking precautions against its obvious speed of
approach on a wet and slippery street or continuing his observation of the oncoming· truck. Toyer
v. Hilleman, 320 Pa. 417, 183 A. 53. It does not
contribute in the least to plaintiff's contention
that he \Yas without fault to consider the respective distances and speeds of the two vehicles. On
the contrary, it is obvious upon such an examination that they were bound to meet. Cf. Woerner
v. Heim, supra.
''The exercise of reasonable prudence required plaintiff to wait f.or the truck to :pass. Clee
v. Brinks, Inc., 135 P. Super. 345, 355, 5 A. 2nd
387. And his failure to look and to govern himself
accordingly before entering the westbound traffic
lane of Snyder Avenue clearly convicts him of
contributory negligence as a matter of law. Lewis
v. Hermann, supra, 112 Pa. Super, page 341, 171
A. 109. There were no other vehicles in the intersection or within the range of plaintiff's vision,
and his failure to look again at the truck after
reaching the eastbound trolley tracks and before
entering its path is inexplicable on any ground but
negligence.''
In Carey vs. DeRose, 282 N. W. 165 (Mich.), the
decision states, page 165:
"We have repeatedly held that one must look
before entering a place of possible danger, such
as crossing an intersection, and maintain observation while crossing.
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.. ~lr. Justice Sharpe, in writing the opinion
of the court in Knight v. ~lerignac, 281 Mich. 684,
:275 N. \Y. 73:2, quoted, with approval, the following from Zuideina v. Bekkering, 256 lVlich. 327,
239 X. \Y. 333:
·It will not do to say that plaintiff's husband looked down the Byron Center road to
the left before attempting to cross the paYement and did not see the automobile of defendant approaching. He must be held to
have seen what he should have seen, which
there was nothing to prevent him from seeing, and if, as contended by plaintiff, he
stopped his automobile, looked to the left, and
did not see what was plainly to be seen, the
approach of defendant's automobile, he was
guilty of contributory negligence which would
bar plaintiff's recovery.'
"In Brown v. Lilli, 281 Mich. 170, 274 N. W.
751, Mr. Justice Chandler, in writing the opinion,
said (page 752) :
'The accident occurred in the day time,
and the facts display nothing to indicate that
plaintiff could not have seen deftmdant 's approaching automobile had she made proper
observation before attempting to cross the
pavement. On the contrary, it stands undisputed that she could have had a clear unobstructed view of the road and could have
seen defendant for a distance of 1215 feet.
Although she testified that she did look and
saw nothing, if she looked and failed to see
that which was plainly visible, she will be held
in point of law to have seen it and guilty of
contributory negligence ... ' ''
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Again, in Johnson v . Harrison, 172 S. E. 259, (V'a.),
plaintiff was driving West, and defendant was driving
North, on highways intersecting at right angles. Plaintiff had an unobstructed view of the highway on which
defendant ~as driving for about ljlO of a mile, and defendant likewise had a similar view of the highway
whereon plaintiff was driving. Plaintiff stated he looked
to his left when about ljlO of a mile from the intersection, and did not see defendant, and that he did not look
again until he entered the intersection, when defendant
was 40 feet away, travelling at 50 miles per hour. Verdict for plaintiff was set aside by the trial eourt, and
judgment rendered for defendant. Judgment affirmed
on appeal. The decision, page 260, was as follows:
"The fact that the plaintiff had, under the
Motor Vehicle Law of Virginia (Laws 1926, c.
474, as amended), the right of way over the defendant on this occasion, in no degree could have
excused him for his failure to look for the defendant, who driving at 50 miles per hour, would
necessarily have been seen by the plaintiff if he
had kept a proper lookout. It cannot be said that
the failure of the defendant to yield the right of
way to the plaintiff was the sole proxim:ate cause
of the accident because it could not have occurred
except for the concurring negligence of the plaintiff in driving into the intersection without looking
for the defendant. The law imposed upon the
plaintiff the duty of exercising ordinary care for
his safety, even though he had the prior right to
cross the intersection ahead of the defendant.
The driver of an :automobile will not be permitted
to drive blindly into another fast approaching
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autonwbile sin1ply because he has the right of way
over such other automobile. For the plaintiff to
stand upon his right of way and fail or refuse- to
look for another automobile which is using the
intersecting road when such other automobile is
in plain view and approaching at a dangerous
speed is the clearest kind of concurring negligence."
And, at Page 261 :
'• In Blashfield 's Cyclopedia of Automobile
Law, vol. 1, p. 494, we read:
'' 'Too firm an insistence upon the right of
way, even when one is clearly entitled to it, may
be the grossest kind of negligence. Under such
rule, if it app~ars to the driver of the car having
the right of way, or if he can, by the exercise of
care commensurate with the danger of the situation, discover that the other driver does not intend to yield the right of way, or intends to take
precedence, and that a collision will likely occur,
he cannot recklessly proceed, but is bound to stop
or to turn aside, if, in the exercise of ordinary care
for his own safety, he can do so. * * * ' ''
In Yellow Cab Co. of Virginia v. Gulley, 194 S. Et.
683, (Va.), judgment for plaintiff was reversed, and
judgment for defendant entered. The Court stated, at
page 686:
''The law requires the driver of a car to keep
a proper lookout, in order that he may avail himself of what the lookout discloses to prevent injury to himself as well as to others. Keeping a
lookout is without avail unless one utilizes the inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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formation thereby secured. One who keeps a
lookout, amd fails to take advantage of what it
discloses, is as guilty of negligence as one who
fails to keep a lookout. The result is the same.
He who doesn't take heed of a danger signal,
plainly seen with the eyes, might just as well
shut his eyes to the signal. It is as true today
as it was in the days of the prophet Is:aiah, that
the fate of one who seeth but observeth not, is
preordained. The rule that one should exercise
ordinary and reasonable care to avoid danger is
as old as the law of self-preservation. None are
so blind as those who will not see.
''The car of the plaintiff was in a place of
safety when the owner and her driver had knowledge of the danger immediately in their front,
and instantly coming closer. Heedless of every
sense of precaution, in the face of a known danger, they proceeded closer to it, and if they did
not actively and actually thrust themselves into
the danger, they did, in fact, invite it. Even if
she had the right of way, she was not absolved
from exercising due care and ordinary circumspection to avoid injury to herself and others.
Nicholson v. Garland, 156 V a. 745, 158 S.E. 901;
Johnson v. Harrison, 161 Va. 804, 172 S.E. 259. ''
Another point merits consideration. The defendant
was proceeding upon an arterial highway protected by
stop signs as he approached the intersection. When the
deceased was between the stop sign and the east edge
of the concrete portion of the intersection, the defendant's truck was in plain sight upon the highway at a
point from 250 to 300 feet north and traveling at a speed
between 35 and 50 miles per hour. This was a large
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heavily loaded vehicle and any person who drives a car
knows that such a vehicle cannot be stopped within the
distance of a light passenger car. At this point, the truck
constituted ·an immediate hazard, and it was the imperative duty of the deceased to have remained where he
was and yielded the right of way of the entire intersection to the truck. Although we do not believe that the
right of way of the truck is of vital importance under
the circumstances of this case, nevertheless it is submitted that the right of way at all times here involved
was in favor of that truck.
For the reasons indicated, the court erred in denying the motion for a directed verdict.
Error No.2
Error No. 2 is directed to the failure of the court
to grant Defendants' motion for a nonsuit made at the
conclusion of the Plaintiffs' testimony. The grounds for
the motion are set out in the transcript at pages 110 to
113, and are the same as the grounds stated for the
motion for a directed verdict except that the last two
grounds for the directed verdict were added at the time
the latter motion was made (Tr. 234), and the following
ground was added to the motion for non-suit:
8. That the evidence in this case shows
without dispute, that 5th West street in Provo,
Utah, was a through highway, and also that the
deceased entered said intersection, after leaving
said stop sign, located on the northeast corner of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

38

said intersection-and that the deceased then proceeded through said intersection to a point where
he was south of the island on said through highway on 5th West street, which island separates
the north bound traffic from the south bound
traffic; and that at that time, the defendants'
truck w:as approaching the pling or place on the
west half of said 5th West street where, if the
defendant Preston Norton, proceeded south, anJ
the deceased proceeded west their line of travel
would meet, and that at said time, that is, when
the deceased was south of the island the defendants' truck was approaching the intersection
and was so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard; and that the deceased failed to
keep any proper look out, or in fact any look out
at all, or failed to bring his automobile to a stop
south of said island, and .allow the defendants'
truck to 'proceed on south, and that instead of so
doing, the deceased continued on west without
keeping a proper or any look out into the line of
travel and to the point towards which the defendants' truck was proceeding; and that by
reason of such failure the deceased was negligent,
as a matter of law, and that his said negligence
proximately contributed to the collision involved
in this case, and the resulting death of the deceased.
For obvious reasons, the argument and authorities
relative to the failure of the court to grant a directed
verdict are in a large measure applicable. At the time
of the non-suit, there was no evidence relative to intoxication, and defendant Preston Norton had not testified.
Paul Adamson's testimony relative to the movement of
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the Gren car across the easterly half of the intersection
was not before the court.
The witnesses called by plaintiff, however, clearly
established the speed and movement of the Gren car as
it passed through the intersection, and in particular,
detail as to how that car moved from the safety zone
area westward. The testimony was not so complete as
it was at the conclusion of the case, but the salient features were before the court and the contributory negligence of the deceased was established. All of the physical
characteristics of the intersection were in evidence.
The reasons which should have caused the court to
grant a directed verdict are in net effect applicable to
this motion, upon the evidence before t'he court at the
time this motion was made.
Errors Nos. 3 and 4
These errors are directed to the trial court's ins true..
tion No. 5 and also paragraph two thereof. There the
jury is charged as follo"WE (R. 164) :
No.5
You are instructed that, unless you find by a
preponderance or greater weight of the evidence,
that at the time and place alleged in the complaint, the defendant Preston L. Norton, while
operating his automobile, was guilty of one or
more of the acts or omissions set forth in paragraph Five of the Complaint, within the Instruction number One above, and unless you further
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find by a preponderance or greater weight of the
evidence, that such act, or acts, omission or
omissions, were the ·proximate cause, as hereinafter defined, of the collision, resulting in the
death of deceased, you must find the issues in
this case in favor of the defendants and against
the plaintiffs and return your verdict of no cause
of action.
But if from a preponderance or greater weight
of the evidence, it is established that the defendant, Preston L. Norton, while operating his truck
and trailer at the time and place alleged, was
guilty of one or more of the acts or omissions so
charged, and you further find from a preponderance of the evidence, that such act or acts of
omission or omissions, proximately caused, as
hereinafter defined to you, the death of deceased,
then it is your duty to return your verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
and to fix the amount of the damages suffered by
the plaintiffs; unless you also find by .a prepon""
derance of the evidence that the deceased, at the
time of the collision, was guilty of contributory
negligence as hereinafter defined, and that such
negligence proximately contributed to the cause
of the death of deceased.
The net effect of the instruction is to submit the
case to the jury upon all of the alleged grounds of
negligence set forth in paragraph 5 of the complaint•
which were specifically outlined in Instruction No. 1
of the trial court (R. 157). These are the acts of negligence referred to above: excessive and unlawful speed;
driving without due regard for and in violation of
traffic rules and regulations; failure to keep a lookout;
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fa;ilure to operate the truck so as to be able to stop or
control the same within a reasonable distance in an
emergency; failure to apply the brakes; steering the
truck on the west portion of the paved portion of the
highway and onto the direct shoulder, instead of remaining on the paved portion of the highway.
There was no evidenct> as to many, if not all, of
these grounds of negligence, and to so instruct the jury
as to permit them to find against the defendants on all
or any of these grounds was prejudicial error.
In Woodward v. Spring Canyon Coal Co., 90 Utah
578, 63 P. 2d 267, th€ court stated, page 273:
"It is the settled law in this jurisdiction that
negligence must be both charged .and proved. A
failure of either is fatal. Here there was a failure
of both. It is equally well established that it is
prejudicial error to permit the jury to find a
verdict based upon either negligence not charged
or negligence charged but not shown ... ''
In Kendall v. Fordham, 79 Utah 256, 9 P. 2d 183,
at page 259:
''The trial court submitted to the jury for its
consideration and determination the question of
whether or not the defendant was negligent as to
each and all of the alleged acts of negligence
charged in the complaint. Defendant requested
the court to charge the jury that there is no evidence that the starting of the fire in defendant's
.automobile was due to the negligence of the defendant, and also that the alleged negligence of
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the defendant in parking his automobile near
plaintiffs' wheat field was withdrawn from the
consideration of the jury. The refusal of the
court to so instruct the jury is assigned as error.
The law is well settled in this jurisdiction, as
well as elsewhere, that it is reversible error for
a court to submit a charged act of negligence to
a jury for its consideration and determination in
the absence of evidence tending to show the
existence of the negligence complained of ... ''
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In Industrial 0 ommission v. Wasatch G~ading Co.,
80 Utah 223, 14 P. 2d 988, page 240:
''It is a well-established rule of law in this,
as well as other jurisdictions, that the acts of
negligence relied upon by the plaintiff for a recovery must be both alleged and proved. It is
reversible error to instruct the jury that they
may find a verdict for a plaintiff because of some
negligence which is not pleaded or which is without support in the evidence ... ''
So far as the ground of negligence relative to failure to keep a lookout is concerned, the evidence clearly
shows that defendant Preston Norton was maintaining a
degree of lookout far greater than was actually required.
He testified that he saw the Gren car prior to the time
that it entered the intersection, and when it was in the
area between the stop sign and the east concrete edge
of the highway, and that his eyes remained on that car
during the entire time that it was traveling across the
intersection and up to the point of impact. Not only is
this evidence uncontradicted, but it is substantiated by
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defendant's affirmative acts of sounding the truck horn,
of applying the brakes, and in edging to the \vest. There
wa~ no evidence upon which the jury could have found
defendant guilty of failure to keep a lookout which had
any casual connection with the accident.
Another ground of negligence is that of violating
traffic rules and regulations, yet nowhere in the instructions is there any indication as to the nature of these
rules ·and regulations, and we are at a loss to discern
any evidence which could have been said to constitute
such a violation in any event. The jury is left free to
speculate upon their own ideas as to what rules and
regulations might exist, and in that existence, apply to
the facts of this case.
A further ground of negligence is that of failing to
apply the brakes. The evidence was that the defendant
applied the brakes immediately upon the first indication
that deceased was going to so continue his travel as to
come into the path of the defendant's truck. Defendant
stated, and his testimony is uncontradicted and amply
supported by the physical evidence, that he immediately
applied the brakes when there was anything to indicate
the necessity of so doing. Wherein was there any evidence to submit this issue of negligence to the jury?
Again, the court advises' the jury that another
ground of negligence upon which they can find a verdict
for the defendant was the act of the defendant in driving
his car to the westerly side of the intersection and onto
the shoulder instead of remaining on the paved portion
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of the highway. If this can be said to be a definition of
an act of negligence, wherein are the legal standards
of care to be applied in making this determination~
Those standards are not in this instruction nor are they
elsewhere. If the instruction on this point had been in
any way properly framed, which it obviously was not,
it would have still been error to have submitted the
ground to the jury because the evidence shows that the
defendant did the only thing he could have done in an
attempt to avoid the accident, and that his action in this
regard actually gave the plaintiff additional time and
space within which he could have stopped the car and
avoided the collision. Had the defendant continued on
a straight course he would have likewise collided with
the Gren car. To have turned to the left when the Gren
car was in the position it was, in the intersection, with
ample opportunity to stop, and where any reasonable
man would have stopped, was likewise beyond the realm
of possible required action.
The next ground was that of failing to operate the
truck so as to be able to stop or control the same within
a reasonable distance in .an emergency. Again, the
balance of the instructions fail to clarify the applicable
rules of law even if they could be applied in any proper
instruction.
See also ~walker v. Butterworth, 210 Pac. 813 (Wash.)
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Errors Nos. 5 and 6
These errors are directed to the trial court's Instruction No. 6 and also to paragraph 3 thereof. There, the
jury is charged as follows (R. 165):
No.6
You are instructed that it is the duty of a
driver of a motor vehicle upon the public highway~ of this ~tate to at all times exercise due
care and diligence in order to prevent injury to
persons or property lawfully upon the highway.
Included in this duty to use due care and diligence,
is the duty to constantly keep a lookout not only
ahead, but to the sides of his vehicle, and to actually see, as well as to look for, all persons, objects
and things which are reasonably within the range
of his vision, and which may constitute a hazard.
It is then his further duty after having seen, or
after he should have seen to use such care and
diligence as a reasonable and prudent person,
having due regard to all conditions of the highway; the presence of intersections; obstructions
or any other condition which may produce a hazard, would use to prevent injury.
And in the event that a driver fails, or neglects at any time to exercise such reasonable
care and diligence, he is negligent. And if, as a
proximate result of such negligence, injury or
damage is caused to any person, the driver so
causing the injury or damage, is liable to the
person thus injured for all damages sustained by
reason of such negligence, unless such person is,
himself, negligent and his negligence proximately
contribute to produce the injury.
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Thus, if you find from a preponderance of the
evidence, in this case, that the defendant, while
operating his truck-trailer failed to use the degree of care and caution as set forth above, and
that as a direct and proximate result thereof,
Melvin V. Gren was killed your verdict should
be in favor of the plaintiffs for such sum as
you shall determine from a preponderance of
the evidence the 'plaintiffs have suffered, unless
you also find that the deceased, Melvin V. Gren,
was also negligent in some respect and such
negligence proximately contributed to produce
the accident with its consequent death of deceased.
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The vice of this instruction is very similar to that
of Instruction No. 5 which was considered in Errors 3
and 4, supra, and much of the reasoning there set forth
is equally applicable. The court attempts to define the
duty of maintaining a proper lookout in the first paragraph of this instruction. The definition itself is faulty
since it requires a constant lookout for all objects within
range of vision which might constitute a hazard. It
would be somewhat difficult, if not impossible, to constantly look to the sides and front of a vehicle.
The greater difficulty arises, however, from the
duty imposed after the driver has seen or should have
seen some hazard. The court sets out that duty as follows:
" ... It is then his further duty after having
seen, or after he should have seen to use such
care .and diligence as a reasonable and prudent
person, having due regard to all conditions of
the highway; the presence of intersections; obSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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structions or any other condition which may produce a hazard, would use to prevent injury."
The driver is in net effect called upon to prevent
injury. because the clear implication is that a reasonable
and prudent person would have done something to prevent that injury. It is neither a clear nor correct statement of applicable law. Moreover, the net effect of the
instruction is to submit to the jury negligence in
general terms, for although the instruction apparently
comn1ences on the theory that it is concerned with failure
to keep a lookout it goes on to add a ge1n~ral duty of carthaving due regard to highway conditions, presence ot
intersections, and obstruction or any other condition
which may produce a hazard. Also, this instruction seems
to indicate that the court views the intersection as two
separate intersections since the plural is used, although in
Intruction No. 21 (R. 175) the jury is clearly told that
the intersection is to be viewed as a single intersection.
The evidence is also clear that there was no obstruction,
either in the form of other traffic or physical structures
to interfere with the view of deceased as he proceeded
across the intersection.
Again, this instruction submits the issue of negligence to the jury on a general theory, notwithstanding
the fact that specific acts of negligence are alleged in
the complaint. It is difficult to conceive anything more
prejudicial that to repeatedly indicate to the jury that
they may so speculate and find.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

48
ERRORS NOS. 7 and 8
These errors are directed to the trial court's instruction No. 8 and to paragraph 3 thereof. There, the jury
is charged as follows (R. 167):
No.8
You are instructed that 5th West street in
Provo, Utah, was, at the time of the accident
herein referred to, a through highway.
It is the law of this state that the driver of a
vehicle shall stop at the entrance to a through
highway, and shall yield the right of way to other
vehicles which have entered the intersection from
said through highway, or which are approaching
so closely on said through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver having.
so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all
other vehicles approaching the intersection on
said through highway shall yield the right of
way to the vehicle so proceeding into or across
the through highway.
This simply means that deceased was not required to cross the said intersection at his peril,
.and that, if you find froln a preponderance of the
evidence that deceased entered the intersection
of 5th West and 12th North, at a time when the
truck of defendants was not within the intersection, or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, then you are instructed that it
was lawful for deceased to proceed into said
intersection with the intention of crossing the
same, and that it became the duty of the said
defendant Preston L. Norton, to slow up 1 or stop
if necessary, to permit the deceased to continue
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on through said intersection. Under such conditions, you are further instructed that the deceased, :Mehin V. Gren, was not required to refrain from attempting to pass through said intersection merely because defendants' truck may
have been at such time so far distant that a
reasonably prudent person, under like circumstances, would conclude that the deceased had
sufficient time to cmnpletely cross the said intersection.
However, if you find by a preponderance of
the evidence, that defendants' truck was so close
to said intersection as to indicate to a reasonably
prudent person, under like circumstances, that
the deceased in attempting to cross said intersection, would create an immediate hazard, then it
was the duty of the deceased to wait and permit
the defendants' truck to pass through the intersection, before continuing across.
Paragraph three of this instruction advises the jury
that if the truck was not within the intersection, or so
close as to constitute an immediate hazard, then the
deceased could enter with the intention of crossing, and
that ''it became the duty of the said defendant Preston
L. Norton, to slow up, or stop if necessary, to permit the
deceased to continue on through said intersection.''
Since under the evidence, there was no question that the
deceased entered the intersection prior to the defendant's
truck, the only possible reason why he might have had
the right of way was that the truck was not so close as
to constitute an immediate hazard. Yet nowhere in this
instruction, or in any other instruction, is there a definition or indication as to what facts might render the
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truck an immediate hazard, and this, notwithstanding a
specific request for such an instruction in defendants'
request No. 7 (R. 146).
In any event, however, the instruction ignores the
physical characteristics of the intersection. Here, there
was a safety zone more than adequate to properly shelter
the Gren car had the deceased wanted or desired to stop,
and he could have so stopped easily at the speed his car
was traveling. Assuming that the general theory of the
instruction was in any way correct, which we deny, it
should have advised the jury as to the actions of a
reasonably prudent man in regard to leaving the sheltered area of the safety zone. If this instruction is considered in connection with Instruction No. 21 (R. 175),
the difficulty becomes even more apparent because that
instruction advises the jury that the intersection is a
single intersection even though it contains ''neutral zones
separating opposing traffic lanes.'' In other words, if the
jury determined that the approaching truck did not constitute an immediate hazard, then the deceased had
carte blanche authority to proceed across the intersection.
This clearly is not the law. As was stated in Hickok v.
Skinner,, supra, at page 517:
" ... It is not unusual for drivers crossing a
wide arterial highway such as this to proceed
across the near half of the street and then stop
or come to a near .stop near the middle to permit
the passage of through traffic on the other half.''
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Errors Nos. 9 and 10
These errors are directed to the trial court's Instruction No. 17 and to the latter portion thereof following
the first sentence. There, the jury was charged as follows
(R.172):
No. 17
You are instructed that, until the contrary is
proven by a preponderance of the evidence, there
is a presumption that the deceased, Melvin V.
Gren, was exercising due and proper care for the
protection of his person and the preservation of
his life, at the time of the accident; this presumption arises from the instinct of self-preservation
and the disposition of man to avoid personal
harm. This presumption is not conclusive, but is
a matter to be considered by the jury, in connection with all the other facts and circumstances in
the case, in determining whether or not the deceased Melvin V. Gren, was guilty of contributory
negligence at the time of the accident.
While such a presumption may exist in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, it ceases to have any force
where the evidence shows that the deceased drove his
car directly into the path of an approaching truck when
one glance would have permitted him to have avoided
the accident. Moreover the instruction not only improperly advises the jury of this 'presumption, but permits
it to be considered along with and as a part of other
evidence in the case. The Utah Law holds this to be
prejudicial error.
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The decision of In .re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463,
484, 5 P. 2d 230, state's:
"When however, the facts and circumstances
were shown concerning which the presumption
was indulged, the presumption ceased, and the
controversy was to be decided upon the evidence
adduced independently of the presumption. In
other words, the presumption was not itself evidence and had no weight as evidence . . . The
rule is well stated in the case of Peters v. Lohr,
supra, as follows:
'A presumption is not evidence of anything, and only relates to a rule of law as to
which party shall first go forward and produce evidence sustaining a matter in issue.
A presumption will serve as and in the place
of evidence in favor of one party or the other
until prima facie evidence has been adduced
by the opposite party; but the presumption
should never be placed in the scale to be
weighed as evidence. The presumption, when
the opposite party has produced prima facie
evidence, has spent its force and served its
purpose, and the party then, in whose favor
the presumption operated, must meet his opponent's prima facie evidence with evidence,
and not presumptions. A presumption is not
evidence of a fact, but purely a conclusion'."
See also In re Pilcher's Estate, 197 P. 2d 143; Mingus
v. Olsson, supra.
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Error No. 11
This error is directed to a portion of the trial court's
Instruction No. 19. There the jury was charged as
follows (R. 174):
"'Further, if you should find the issues in
favor of the plaintiffs, you may assess as damages, the cost of the funeral and burial expense,
which said sum shall not be in excess of $558.50. ''
Over defendants' objections, the court allowed the
introduction of evidence relative to the payment by the
surviving widow of the funeral bill of deceased in the
amount of $558.50 (Tr. 104, 105). There is not a scintilla
of evidence in the record, however, showing the insolvency of the estate or anything connected with the estate,
and nothing to show that any claim for reimbursement
was ever attempted by the surviving widow. For these
reasons, there was no basis upon which the court could
have allowed the jury to recover these damages, and it
was error to so instruct.
In Morr-ison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. 2d 772,
the court states, pages 780, 781:
"It is elementary that a party may not enhance damages. Every party must 'exercise reaonable care and diligence to avoid loss or to minimize or lessen the resulting damage, and to the
extent that his damages are the result of his active :and unreasonable enhancement thereof or are
due to his failure to exercise such care and diligence, he cannot recover.' 15 Am. Jur. p. 420,
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Sec. 27. An heir who has paid funeral expenses
for the death of an adult should not be permitted
to enhance the damages by reason of his failure
to seek reimbursement from the estate. The heir
in such a case is not legally obligated to pay funeral expenses, but the estate has a primary legal
obligation.
''We conclude that before a plaintiff may recover funeral expenses in an action under 104-3~
11, R.S.U. 1933, he must show that the estate is
insolvent and unable to pay such funeral expense.
and that the plaintiff or one of the heirs has paid
or that he has entered into a legally enforcible
obligation to pay the funeral expenses.''
Error No.12
Error No. 12 is directed to the following portion of
trial court's Instruction No. 21 (R. 175):
No. 21
That the intersection of 5th West street and
12th North, where the accident occurred, constitutes a single intersection even though 5th West
at that point has neutral zones separating opposing traffic lanes.
It is not contended by the defendants that the mere
fact of a safety zone in the middle of a highway next
adjacent to the intersection changes the general rules of
law applicable to intersections. It is, however, contended
that this particular instruction creates a false impression
in the minds of the jury as to what effect, if any, should
be given to the existence of the safety zone in determining
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this particular case. The instruction tells the jury, in
net effect, that the intersection of the accident is a single
intersection, even though a neutral zone separates opposing traffic lanes. When this instruction is considered in
connection with Instruction No. 8 (R. 167) it would lead
the jury to believe that the existence of the safety zone
was of no consequence in this action, and that the deceased could proceed with impunity across the intersection once his right to commence this course of action
had arisen. Such an instruction is extremely prejudicial
since it .permits the jury to ignore one of the most
essential physical features of the intersection, so far
as the defense of the action is concerned.
Error No. 13
This error is directed to the trial court's Instruction
No. 23. There the jury is charged as follows (R. 177):
No. 23
The court instructs the jury that in the event
you should find the deceased may have been guilty
of negligence which contributed to the accident
and to his death, by putting himself in a position
of peril, yet if, thereafter, the defendant, seeing
the position in which the deceased was, had an
opportunity by the exercise of reasonable care
and diligence, to save the deceased from the consequence of his negligence, it was the defendant's
duty to do so ; and if he failed to do so, and that
such failure was the ·proximate cause of the death
of the deceased, the plaintiff may still recover by
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reason of what is called the last clear chance
doctrine.
This instruction clearly submits the case to the jury
on the theory of the last clear chance doctrine, and the
instruction itself so states. Not only has this court repeatedly held that the doctrine is of limited application to collisions involving two moving cars at an intersection, but
in this particular case, such a submission completely
ignores the established facts. The doctrine, as will be
hereinafter noted in the cited authorities, clearly ccntem·plates that the defendant knew and appreciated the
danger to the car of the deceased at a time when it was
possible for the defendant to take an affirmative act
which would have avoided the collision, notwithstanding
the deceased had himself negligently assumed a position
of peril from which he could not extricate himself.
In this case, the peril of the deceased was not apparent until he had left the area of the safety zone in the
center of the highway and commenced proceeding from
this point westward. There was no reason whatsoever
for the defendant, Preston Norton, to assume that the
sheltered area would not serve the purpose for which it
was intended, and that the deceased would stop at that
point. When deceased left the safety zOne, however, it
was then too late for the defendant to effectively prevent
the accident. His truck was approximately 100 feet away
at that time, travelling at a speed from 35 to 50 miles
per hour, and the testimony

conclusive!~

shows that the

application of the brakes could not and did not stop the
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truck before reaching the point of impact. So far as
turning to the west, the truck did edge as far as it was
practicable to do so without ultimately colliding with
the :::;ervice station which \Yas located at the southwest
corner. So far as warning, the evidence sho\YS that at
that point, the truck horn was steadily sounding. It is
clear that the necessary elements for application of this
doctrine were entirely lacking in the instant case, and
the negligence of the deceased was a continuing and contributing factor of the accident, if not the sole factor,
up to the point of the collision.

Hickok v. Skinner, supra} specifically points out that
the last clear -chance doctrine is of limited application in
the portion of the opinion quoted under argument in connection with Error 1, herein.
Although the facts of Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah
346, 166 P. 2d 230 are markedly different from those of
the present case, the language of the decision discusses
the doctrine at length, and shows that the use of the
word ''clear'' is advisedly used in defining the doctrine.
At page 237, the court states:
''One should not be held liable for failing to
avoid the effect of the other's negligence in a
situation where it is speculative as to whether he
was afforded a clear opportunity to avoid it. In
a situation where both parties are on the move
the significance of the word ''clear'' is most important. Otherwise we may put the onus of
avoiding the effect of one's negligence on a party
not negligent. That party's negligence only arises
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when it is definitely established that there was
ample time and opportunity to avoid the accident which was not taken advantage of.''
The case of Johnson v. Sacramento Northern Ry.,
129 P. 2d 503 involved a collision between a motorcyclist
and a train, but contains an excellent summary of the
doctrine. At page 505 the court details the elements
which must be present to apply the doctrine:
"Before examining the evidence in greater
detail, it is appropriate to refer to the essential
elements which must be present to warrant a
recovery, under the last clear chance doctrine, by
one who has himself been guilty of negligence.
Said doctrine may be said to be an exce'ption to
the general rule and its application is limited to
those cases in which all of said elements are
!present. In the frequently cited case of Palmer
v. Tschudy, 191 Cal. 696, at page 700, 218 p. 36,
at page 37, the court said: 'The last clear chance
rule presupposes: That the plaintiff has been
negligent; that as a result thereof she is in a
situation of danger from which she cannot escape
by the exercise of ordinary care; that the defendant is aware of her dangerous situation
under such circumstances that he realizes, or
ought to realize, her inability to escape therefrom;
that he then has a cle.ar chance to avoid injuring
her by the exercise of ordinary care, and fails to
do so. If all of these elements are present, the
rule applies and enables the plaintiff to recover,
notwithstanding her own negligence. But if any
of them be absent the rule does not apply, and
the case is governed by the ordinary rules of
negligence and contributory negligence.'
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And at pag·e 506:
''It is al~o sig·nificant to note that the 'situation
of danger' or 'position of danger', referred to in
the authorities dealing with the last clear chance
doctrine, is reached only when a plaintiff, moving
toward the path of an oncoming train or vehicle,
has reached a position 'from which he cannot
escape by the exercise of ordinary care.' In other
words, it is not enough, under the last clear chance
doctrine, that plaintiff is merely approaching a
position of danger, he has the same opportunity;.
to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary
care, as has the defendant. In such cases, the
ordinary rules of negligence and contributory
negligence apply, rather than the exceptional doctrine of last clear chance. It is only in cases in
which, after plaintiff reaches a ·position of danger,
defendant has a last clear chance to avoid the
accident by the exercise of ordinary care, and
.plaintiff has no similar chance, that the doctrine
is applicable.''
The language above is of particular application to
the instant case, because the deceased himself repeatedly
had an opportunity to have stopped and avoided the
collision, and at a time when the defendant could do
nothing to so avoid the accident himself. This was true at
the time the deceased reached the safety zone, and it
was true between the west edge of the safety zone and
at least ten feet to the west of that edge. The testimony
conclusively showed that it was utterly in1possible to
stop the truck at this point because of its weight and
rate of travel.
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In Poncino v. Reid-Murdock & Co., 28 P. 2d 932, the
decision states, page 936:
"While the doctrine of last clear chance has
been applied in certain exceptional cases involving collisions between moving vehicles, we are of
the opinion that it should not be applied to the
ordinary case in which the act creating the peril
occurs practically simultaneously with the happening of the accident and in which neither party
can fairly be said to have had a last clear chance
thereafter to avoid the consequences. To apply
the doctrine to such cases would be equivalent to
denying the existence of the general rule which
makes contributory negligence a bar to recovery.''
See also Delsman v. Bertotti, 93 P. 2d 371; Bullock
v. Luke, supra; Martin v. Sheffield, 189 P. 2d 127; Buchhein v. Atchison, T. & 8. F. Ry. Co .., 75 P. 2d 280; Anthony
v. Costello Motor Co., 88 P. 2d 1025; Juergens v. Front,
163 S. E. 618.
It was also error to submit the instruction to the
jury since the complaint fails to specify the facts which
would invoke the operation of the doctrine. In Stitzell v.
Arthur Morgan Trucking Co., 118 S. W. 2d 49, the court
states:
''Not alone was the form of the instruction on
the humanitarian doctrine erroneous, but ... the
petition wholly failed to state any cause of action
against defendant Brown under that (humanitarian) rule for the reason th:at the .petition failed
to allege that at any time or place plaintiff came
into or was in a position of imminent peril and
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that defendant Brown breached any duty owing
by him to plaintiff under the hum:anitarian rule
... The petition thus failing to state a cause of
action under the humanitarian rule, no instruction, however correct in form, could have been
given submitting the case against defendant
Brown under the humanitarian rule.''
The instruction itself, moreover, is not a correct
statement of the last clear chance doctrine. For example,
it fails to cover one of the key points of the doctrine
that the person who has negligently placed himself in a
position of peril must be so situated that he cannot by his
own efforts extricate himself or prevent t~e inevitable
injury. The instruction simply deals with the position of
peril, and relieves the plaintiff from all further responsibility once that position is reached. The authorities defining the rule are clearly to the contrary.
Errors No. 14 and 15
These errors are directed to the trial court's Instruction No. 25, and to paragraph 3 thereof. There, the jury
is charged as follows (R. 178) :
No. 25
You are instructed further that it is the duty
of a driver of a motor vehicle upon and along
the public highways of this State to at all times
exercise due care and diligence in the driving of
the same.
In this connection, you are instructed that it
was the duty of the driver of the trailer-truck,
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Preston L. Norton, to constantly keep a proper
lookout as he travelled along on said U. S. Highway 91, and particularly as he was about to enter
the intersection in question on entering Provo
City, and to keep his truck-trailer under proper
control, having due regard for traffic crossing
the Highway at 12th North on 5th West, or for
any other condition which may produce a hazard
or accident; and to drive said truck-trailer at
such time and .place so as to have the same under
proper control, having regard not only to the
speed of said truck, but also as to the weight of
said truck-trailer; of the load that he was carrying, as well as ability to stop, and to use ordinary
care and diligence so as to prevent accidents and
collisions.
And if you find from a preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant Norton, in so driving along the Highway US 91, did not keep a
proper lookout at such time and place; or failed
or neglected to exercise reasonable care and diligence at said time and place, with regard to the
above named conditions, and that such carelessness and negligence was the proximate cause of
the accident and resulting death of the deceased;
and you further find that the deceased was not
guilty of contributory negligence, as explained
to you in these Instructions, then your verdict
should be for the plaintiffs and against the defendants, and you should assess damages as you
may determine, from the evidence, is just and
equitable.
The net effect of this instruction is to submit to the
jury the negligence of defendant Norton in not keeping
a proper lookout as he approached and entered the inter-
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section. As has been pointed out heretofore, there is no
evidence to support this submission of this ground of
negligence to the jury, and it should not have been so
submitted. The evidence shows clearly that the defendant
saw the deceased as he was driving between the stop sign
on the northeast corner and the easterly edge of the
intersection, and that he thereafter continued to clearly
observe him during the entire traverse of the intersection.
And there is not one word in the evidence to the contrary.
If the defendant was negligent, which we deny, that
negligence most certainly did not consist of failing to
keep a ·proper lookout, and the jury should not have been
allowed to speculate upon this ground.
Apparently a second ground of negligence submitted
to the jury by this instruction is that the defendant
''failed or neglected to exercise reasonable care and
diligence.'' This is, in net effect, a charge to the jury
that they may find defendant guilty of negligence upon
any ground which might enter their minds, and which
amounted to failure to exercise reasonable care and diligence. Where, as here, the com·plaint specifically alleges
the grounds of negligence upon which the action is to be
tried, the jury's deliberations should be confined to those
acts specifically enumerated which have been proved by
the evidence. If the case can be submitted in this manner
after such pleading, there is little point or purpose in
the pleadings themselves.
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Error No. 16
Error No. 16 is directed to the trial court's refusal
to instruct the jury in accordance with defendants' Request No. 5 (R. 144). That request reads as follows:
No.5
You are instructed that in the exercise of due
care, a person who is using or about to use a
public highway is required to make reasonable
use of his senses and intelligence to observe and
discover impending danger and to see what is in
plain sight upon the highway and to hear a
warning which is clearly audible.
In this case, the evidence shows without dispute that immediately to the north of the center
of the intersection at which the accident occurred,
there was located a neutral zone or safety island
twenty-two and one-half feet wide and that there
was adequate room in the intersection immediately south of this zone for deceased to have stopped
his automobile and protected himself against
south-bound traffic. And if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the time the
automobile driven by deceased approached the
area in said intersection south of said safety zone,
the truck driven by defendant Preston Norton
was in plain view upon the highway, and that the
deceased knew, or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have known, that by his continuing
across the intersection at that time a collision
might result between said truck and said automobile, and if you further find that the driver of
an automobile, in the exercise of reasonable care
under like circumstances, could have stopped his
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automobile within the area south of said safety
zone, or before reaching the lane of travel of said
truck, and avoided the collision, then you are instructed that the failure on the part of the deceased to stop constituted negligence, and if you
also find that said negligence proximately contributed to said collision, then you should return
a verdict in favor of the defendant and against
the plaintiffs, no cause of action.
This request may be said to constitute the defendant's theory of the case, and is in effect a summary of the
applicable rules of law to be applied to the conduct of
the deceased in driving his ~r across the intersection.
Not only did the trial court fail to clearly or adequately
present this theory, which follows the theory of law
advanced in the cases cited in this brief in connection
with the argument on Error No. 1, but has also instructed
the jury in a manner which negatives the essential portions of this instruction. An example may be found in the
courts Instructions Nos. 6 and 8 which have been previously discussed under the arguments on Errors 5 and 6,
and 7 and8.
The necessity of submitting the case to the jury
upon a proper theory of the defense of a defendant, as
well as the theory of the plaintiff, would seem so well
established as not to require extensive citation. As the
court stated in Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124
Pac. 522, at page 124:
''Because the matter was not submitted to the
jury 'under proper instructions', and on the
theory of the defendant, is what gives rise to the
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defendant's complaint. There are two parties to
a lawsuit. Each, on a submission of the case to a
jury, is entitled to a submission of it on his theory
and the law in respect thereof. The defendant's
theory as to the c:ause of the accident is embodied
in the proposed requests. There is some evidence,
as we have shown, to render them applicable to
the case. That is not disputed. We think the
court's refusal to charge substantially as requested was error. That the ruling was prejudicial and works a reversal of the judgment is
self-evident and unavoidable.''
See also Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P. 2d 114,
120.
Error No. 17
This error is directed to the trial court's failure to
instruct the jury in accordance with defendant's Request
No. 7. That request reads as follows (R. 7):
No.7
You may ask yourselves the question: When
has a vehicle on a through highway approached
too close to an intersection as to constitute an
immediate hazard~ The answer is that the aprp·roaching vehicle is that close whenever, if a
reasonably prudent person were in the position
of the driver who has stopped his automobile at
the entrance to the through highway, he would
apprehend the probability of colliding with the
approaching vehicle were he then to enter the
highway.
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This request defines the point at which an automobile
proceeding on an arterial highway is approaching so
close to an intersection as to constitute an immediate
hazard to another car attempting to cross, after stopping
at a stop sign, at right angles to the arterial highway.
A definition of an immediate hazard most certainly would
seem essential if the jury is to be adequately advised on
a crossing accident of this kind. The court, in Instruction
~ o. 6, and again in Instruction No. 11, advises the jury,
or attempts to advise the jury, as to the effect of proceeding across the intersection upon the existence of an
immediate hazard, but neither of these instru~tions, nor
any other instruction actually given, adequately defines
the factual situation which will create the immediate
hazard.
Errors No. 18, No. 19 and No. 20
Errors No. 18, No. 19 and No. 20 are directed to the
trial court's refusal to instruct the jury in accordance
with defendant's Requests No. 13, No. 14 and No. 15.
The purpose of these three requests is to specifically remove from the jury's consideration the negligent acts of
defendant, as charged in the complaint, of failing to
apply his brakes, failing to keep a careful lookout, and
failure to have the truck under proper control. The requests read as follows:
No.13
You are instructed that the evidence in this
case shows without dispute that the defendant,
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Preston Norton, at the time of the accident, in
approaching and 'passing over the intersection
involved in this case, applied the brakes of the
truck which he was then and there operating, and
in arriving at your verdict you should eliminate
from consideration the charge of negligence made
by plaintiffs that said defendant, Preston Norton, failed to apply the brakes of said truck.
No. 14
You are instructed that there is no evidence
to show that the defendant, Preston Norton, in
approaching and passing over the intersection
involved in this accident, failed to keep a careful
lookout; and in arriving at your verdict you
should eliminate from consideration the charge of
negligence made by plaintiffs, that said driver of
defendants' truck in approaching and passing
through said intersection failed to keep a proper
lookout.
No. 15
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Preston Norton, at the
time and place of the collision or the accident
involved in this case, had the truck and trailer
under control, the Court instructs you that in
arriving at your verdict you should eliminate
from consideration the charge of negligence made
by plaintiffs, that the defendant, Preston Norton,
failed to keep said truck and trailer under control.
The basic difficulty again centers around the failure
of the court to in any way limit or define the grounds of
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negligence which the jury could consider, and upon which
evidence had been introduced. lls has heretofore been
indicated, the evidence as to lookout is certainly clearly
to the effect that Norton saw the deceased's car prior to
its entering the intersection, and that he continued to
see it at all times across the intersection to impact. So
far as the failure to apply brakes is concerned, the evidence is clearly to the effect that the brakes were applied
immediately upon the creation of danger when deceased
left the safety zone. So far as the failure to keep the
truck under proper control, the evidence is also clearly
to the effect that the defendant had the truck under control at all times and that he actually, in the exercise of
that control, veered to the west in an attempt to avoid
the collision. lls to all three of these matters, we believe
the controlling factor is that up to the time it became
apparent that the deceased was going to pass the center
of the street, there was no occasion to take any definite
positive action, so far as the defendant was concerned,
and that prior to this time, and while deceased was crossing the easterly one-half of the highway, the defendant
was entitled to assume that the stop at the inters·ection
center would be made.
It was prejudicial error to permit the jury to speculate on these grounds of negligence.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the trial court
erred in failing to grant the defendants' motions for a
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nonsuit and directed verdict, and that in the actual trial
of the case the trial court committed prejudicial error in
many of its instructions and in failing to submit to the
jury many of the defendants' requested instructions.
Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN, THURMAN and WORSLEY,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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